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THESIS

**UNTAPPED AIR FORCE RESOURCES FOR
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION
OPERATIONS**

by

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June 2006

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**UNTAPPED AIR FORCE RESOURCES FOR
STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
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This thesis reviews the potential contributions of the United States Air Force to stabilization and reconstruction operations. Specifically, the Air Force's On-Scene Commanders Course and Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders are assessed as potential Air Force assets that could be employed in stabilization and reconstruction operations. This research will determine the course's ability to satisfy key needs identified in the post-conflict literature and if the course would be useful for other U.S. agencies with responsibilities in post-conflict operations. Finally, this paper asks if Mission Support Group Commanders can provide critical skill-sets valuable in stability operations. This work will assess the applicability of these Air Force leaders' duties for possible use in post-conflict operations by reviewing the Air Force's Objective Wing Structure and duty histories of current and former Mission Support Group Commanders.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	INTRODUCTION.....	1
A.	RESEARCH QUESTION AND OVERVIEW	2
B.	METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES.....	4
II.	IDENTIFYING GAPS IN U.S. CAPABILITIES	5
A.	CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION.....	5
1.	Differences in Cultures, Procedures, and Objectives	5
2.	Operational Results of Differences.....	6
3.	Changing U.S. Policy Through Better Integration	8
B.	INCREASING TRAINING AND EDUCATION	10
1.	Failure of the “Lessons Learned” Concept	10
2.	Creating a Training and Education Culture	11
C.	ASSESSING CURRENT DOD ASSETS	12
1.	Situational Assessments.....	12
2.	Matching Taskings and Capabilities.....	13
III.	INCREASING POST-CONFLICT TRAINING.....	17
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	17
B.	MILITARY ROLES AND THE CULTURE OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS	18
1.	The Department of Defense Culture Debate	19
2.	The Role of the Military	22
C.	THE MILITARY’S STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS	24
1.	Introduction.....	24
2.	The Universal Joint Task List.....	24
3.	Public Law 108-447 and the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization	26
4.	Department of Defense Directive 3000.05.....	26
5.	National Security Presidential Directive 44.....	27
D.	THE AIR FORCE ON-SCENE COMMANDERS COURSE	28
1.	Specific Course Elements	29
2.	Major Benefits.....	31
3.	A Spectrum of Assistance for Training.....	34
IV.	PERSONNEL RESOURCES FOR POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS	37
A.	INTRODUCTION.....	37
B.	MAJOR CONCERNs IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS	38
C.	THE AIR FORCE MISSION SUPPORT GROUP	40
D.	MISSION SUPPORT GROUP COMMANDERS	43
1.	Numbers and Locations.....	44
2.	Mission Support Group Experience.....	44
3.	Joint Service Experience	45

4.	Time Available After Command Tour.....	45
5.	Advanced Education Trends.....	46
6.	A Resource for Post-Conflict Environments?	46
V.	LEVERAGING EXISTING ASSETS FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION	51
A.	SUMMARY OF FINDINGS	51
B.	UNTAPPED AIR FORCE RESOURCES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS	54
LIST OF REFERENCES		55
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST		61

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 1.	The Gap in U.S. Capabilities	19
Figure 2.	Increasing Joint Training Provides More Flexibility	21
Figure 3.	Hierarchy of Mandates for the National Military Strategy	25
Figure 4.	Major Topics of the On-Scene Commanders Course	30
Figure 5.	An Air Force Training Resource to Answer Multiple Doctrine and Policy Directives	33
Figure 6.	Typical Air Force Combat Wing Structure.....	42
Figure 7.	Summary of Mission Support Group Commanders.....	47
Figure 8.	An Air Force Model of Post-Conflict Resources.....	48

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I. INTRODUCTION

“The U.S. government-civilian agencies and the DoD...lack training and educational programs...It is essential that multiple agencies employ shared collaboration, decision-making aids, and execution tools to assess, plan, and execute integrated operations.”

-- Defense Science Board¹

The U.S. military has extensive experience conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. This includes peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure repair and a multitude of activities below major combat operations. Unfortunately, for all the successes in traditional combat operations, the inevitable post-conflict phase continues to baffle U.S. policymakers. Stability operations constitutes what Nancy Roberts refers to as a *wicked problem*, in which there is no agreement on the root causes of post-conflict instability and even less consensus on the solutions.² This leads to long and costly endeavors for the United States and military personnel in particular. For example, the past three years of military operations in Iraq has cost taxpayers approximately \$220 billion with approximately \$29 billion in funding for security assistance and reconstruction projects.³ Post-conflict environments such as Iraq frequently remain insecure even after the expenditure of large amounts of effort, funding, and lives. The Defense Science Board’s Task Force on Transformation asserts that post-conflict success will “require the leadership of the agency with the greatest stake in most

¹ *Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Transformation: A Progress Assessment, Volume 1.* By William Schneider, Jr., chairman (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, February 2006), 25.

² Nancy C. Roberts, “Coping with Wicked Problems: The Case of Afghanistan,” in Lawrence Jones, James Guthrie, and Peter Steane, eds., *Learning from International Public Management Reform* (New York: Elsevier, 2001), 353-375. Roberts’ typology distinguishes three types of problems: 1) Simple Problems have consensus on the identification of the problem and its solution; 2) Complex Problems find consensus on the definition of the problem but find disagreements between stakeholders on the problem solution; 3) Wicked Problems have disagreements between stakeholders regarding problem identification and an acceptable solution.

³ Although there are numerous analyses of the cost of Iraq operations, see Steven M. Kosiak, “The Cost of U.S. Military Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Through Fiscal Year 2006 and Beyond,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 3 January 2006.

operations – the DoD.”⁴ This work assesses selected portions of the Air Force role in post-conflict operations and hopes to begin a more robust debate on how Air Force resources can help decision makers.

This thesis reviews how U.S. resources are organized for stability operations. There is little doubt that the United States can muster incredible financial and personnel resources for post-conflict operations. However, there may be key aspects of the Department of Defense (DoD) that are being overlooked in the current organizational framework used for post-conflict operations. Reviewing Air Force leadership and training resources may help to identify additional tools to improve the chances for success in stability operations. The Air Force may possess resources that, if leveraged, could reduce risks to U.S. personnel and ensure that limited resources are used more efficiently.

A. RESEARCH QUESTION AND OVERVIEW

Stability operations constitute a growing mission area for the U.S. DoD. This thesis reviews the potential contributions of the United States Air Force in particular, to determine how the Air Force might contribute to stabilization and reconstruction in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for post-conflict operations, there may be training resources and personnel with unique skills and experience that could significantly impact stabilization and reconstruction operations. The Air Force’s On-Scene Commanders Course and Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders, who are primarily responsible for security and infrastructure of Air Force installations, are examples of Air Force assets that could be employed in stabilization and reconstruction operations. The thesis is organized into three main areas: First, a review of post-conflict operations identifies major areas for improving U.S. efficiency. Second, the thesis reviews Air Force training resources applicable in stabilization environments. The final area of inquiry is to identify Air Force personnel who may have training, experience, and expertise to address the findings of the literature and training assessments.

The methods and assumptions the United States utilizes to organize its resources for stability operations continues to be an area of discussion for practitioners and policy

⁴ *Report of the Defense Science Board*, 25.

makers. These discussions have identified three broad areas or gaps in U.S. effectiveness in stability operations. First, there are concerns regarding the integration of civilian and military personnel, resources, and procedures. These discussions focus on improving U.S. post-conflict capabilities through a better integration of civilian and military resources. A second focus is on training and education for people involved in stability operations. Although there are extensive calls in the literature for increased training, there is less consensus regarding the methods to be employed. Third is a focus on how the military is structured. These debates involve assessments of currently-existing DoD assets. Much of this discussion involves how current military units and resources can be realigned for stability operations.

After the major themes in the literature are assessed, the paper continues with a review of Air Force training assets to determine their applicability for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Specifically, the Air Force's On-Scene Commander's Course is a possible method of increasing training for post-conflict environments. This research will determine the course's ability to satisfy key needs identified in the literature regarding post-conflict operations. Perhaps more importantly, this research will also determine if the On-Scene Commander's Course prepares students for key tasks in the area of stabilization and reconstruction and whether this course would be useful for other U.S. agencies with responsibilities in post-conflict operations.

Finally, this paper asserts that Mission Support Group Commanders can provide critical skill-sets valuable in stability operations. These senior officers possess skills that have been identified as gaps in the literature and represent a resource that could be used for a new mission area. This work will assess the applicability these Air Force leaders' duties for possible use in post-conflict operations by reviewing the Air Force's Objective Wing Structure and duty histories of current and former Mission Support Group Commanders.

The thesis concludes with recommendations for the future, specifically, a spectrum of assistance that could provide a framework to leverage Air Force assets to add to U.S. capabilities in post-conflict environments. The findings suggest that there existing Air Force assets may prove beneficial to increasing U.S. success in post-conflict environments. The On-Scene Commander's Course is a training resource that answers

many of the concerns regarding the need for greater civilian-military integration and training and education of personnel involved in stability operations. The Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders possess skills that will be valuable in post-conflict environments. They are the primary senior officers responsible for security and infrastructures at their installations and they are perhaps the most capable at integrating the various response agencies typically involved in post-conflict contingency operations. This group of officers are also required to attend the On-Scene Commander's Course as part of their duties as Mission Support Group Commanders. Both examples appear to address the major concerns of the post-conflict literature.

B. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES

Information from five main sources will be reviewed to assess the use of Air Force training and personnel to improve U.S. results in post-conflict operations. An extensive literature review will be conducted to assess trends and issues that frame the debate about improving success in stability operations. This research continues with an overview of doctrine and policy to identify strategic-level guidance for U.S. agencies involved in post-conflict operations. Third, the thesis reviews the On-Scene Commanders course from Air University to assess applicability for stabilization operations. A fourth area of inquiry involves how the Air Force organizes its resources for security and infrastructure requirements. This involves a review of Air Force doctrine and organizational structures to determine parallels for post-conflict operations. The final area of inquiry involves an assessment of the career histories of Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders drawn from the Air Force Military Personnel Data System. This electronic database of job histories and qualifications will be used to determine the potential usefulness of Mission Support Group Commanders for stabilization operations. These senior officers may have job experiences that mirror some of the concerns addressed in the literature and may prove useful for thinking about how to select officers for post-conflict assignments.

II. IDENTIFYING GAPS IN U.S. CAPABILITIES

A. CIVIL-MILITARY INTEGRATION

Major works on stabilization and reconstruction literature tends to center around three themes. First, many works are concerned with the implications of the civil-military nature of stability operations. The different civilian and military cultures, operating procedures, and objectives of civilian and military organizations are potentially damaging to operational effectiveness. Disparate organizations may not always appreciate they are working towards a common goal. The mechanics of integration form a second issue of concern – that is, organizational structures as well as cultures may inhibit successful cooperation. A final issue is how better civil-military integration can improve the policy making process. This completes the civil-military integration cycle that begins with culture, continues with the mechanics of integration, and concludes with implications for making the process better.

1. Differences in Cultures, Procedures, and Objectives

In 2000, the RAND Corporation focused on differing cultures, procedures, and objectives of civilian and military components of stabilization and reconstruction operations in *Strengthening the Partnership*.⁵ The United Nations, Non-Governmental Organizations and other agencies involved in post-conflict operations have timelines that may be very different from those of the military, while relief organizations often remain in an area long after the military forces have departed. This work notes a core conflict at the heart of civilian-military disconnects: the military often comes across as inflexible, uncaring, and overbearing, little concerned with long-term policy. *Strengthening the Partnership* identifies a convincing civilian-military disconnect when it asserts that relief agencies may have limited sympathy for the military's concern for an exit strategy since relief agencies normally believe that sustainable improvement requires a commitment of resources and personnel over an extended period of time. Although the work may overstate its critique that “most NGOs plan poorly or not at all,”⁶ this effort makes a

⁵ Daniel Byman, Ian Lesser, Bruce Pirnie, Cheryl Benard, and Matthew Waxman, *Strengthening the Partnership: Improving Military Coordination with Relief Agencies and Allies in Humanitarian Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2000).

⁶ Ibid., xvii.

forceful argument that there is a distinct cultural difference in the military's centralized planning and NGO penchant for more independence and freedom of action. Perhaps the best summary is found in the assertion that "on its own, the military cannot solve the coordination problems inherent in humanitarian assistance."⁷

Christopher Conlin's "What do you do for an Encore?" and Scott Feil's "Building Better Foundations" largely agree that there are distinct tasks to be performed by civilian and military institutions, but refocus the debate on determining transition points and processes. Each stresses the need for the specific specialties of individual organizations, but asserts that the process must be integrative. While transition operations from major combat operations to the post-conflict environment are vital to the long-term stability of an area, the process cannot be solely run by the military.⁸ Civilian solutions and cooperation are vital to the political solutions that can be effectively combined with the security provided by the military. Although U.S. military involvement has been a key determinant to the prevention of further violence and deaths, true and lasting security must involve more than a narrowly-defined military task.⁹ It must involve a coordinated effort of military and relief agencies. Johanna Forman and Michael Pan's analysis asserts that the U.S. admiration for expertise operationalized into narrowly-specialized government agencies may be creating the civilian-military gap and integration problems. Their work also posits that a common vocabulary and frames of reference would also aid in creating a more integrated response.¹⁰

2. Operational Results of Differences

The second issue in civilian-military integration involves the mechanics of integrating civilian and military institutions. Specifically, this area of the literature continues the discussion of gaps in the integration of civilian and military resources by moving from an acknowledgement that there are different cultures to how those

⁷ Byman and others, *Strengthening the Partnership*, xxi.

⁸ Christopher C. Conlin, "What do you do for an Encore?" *Marine Corps Gazette* 88, no. 9 (September 2004): 74-80.

⁹ Scott Feil, "Building Better Foundations: Security in Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 97-109.

¹⁰ Johanna Mendelson Forman and Michael Pan, "Filling the Gap: Civilian Rapid Response Capacity for Post-Conflict Reconstruction," In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, 116-125 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

differences are expressed in post-conflict environments. Although Kimberly Field and Robert Perito focus primarily on security, police, and justice matters, they are correct in asserting that the military has two frequently conflicting demands as their current priorities are shifting from state-on-state kinetic conflict to stability operations¹¹ First, the military must maintain its ability to engage in traditional warfighting while answering the growing call for involvement in stability operations. Field and Perito assert that the military's second problem is bigger: it must do a better job at integrating civilian organizations and capabilities. They assert that although the military has sufficiently answered the first issue, the second problem results in ineffective U.S. post-conflict policy and procedures. Their work holds that although stability operations frequently prevent the clear delineation of tasks, operational success will come only when the barriers are lowered between civilian and military organizations.

William Flavin's work focuses on gaps in civilian-military integration and the effect on security and reconstruction in post-conflict environments.¹² He asserts that the lack of an interagency plan at the beginning of Operation Enduring Freedom created gaps in the security and effectiveness of relief organizations. Flavin describes how "the UN encouraged many countries to engage directly with the Afghan authorities."¹³ Flavin's assessment is a convincing account of how a lack of central oversight and coordination can result in ineffective and inefficient policies. It is also a sobering reminder of how a lack of integration can cause confusion and inefficient use of resources.

Bruce Jones focuses on the two main problems in strategic coordination.¹⁴ First, there can be a gap between the people that negotiate agreements or procedures and the people and organizations that must implement them. The second problem identified in Jones' work is the problem of a coordinated response. Specifically, there may be gaps in

¹¹ Kimberly C. Field and Robert M. Perito, "Creating a Force for Peace Operations: Ensuring Stability with Justice," *Parameters* 32, no. 4 (Winter 2002): 77-87.

¹² William Flavin, *Civil Military Operations: Afghanistan* (Carlisle: United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute, 23 March 2004).

¹³ *Ibid.*, xi.

¹⁴ Bruce D. Jones, "The Challenges of Strategic Coordination," In *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*, ed. Stephen John Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth M. Cousens, 89-115 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

the goals of the different actors, and when the actors might agree on goals, the differing methods of implementation may cause problems.

Michelle Flournoy takes a different and important view of organizing resources for success in stability operations.¹⁵ While Flournoy asserts that strategic planning is critical to developing a successful plan of action, she contends that the planning *process* may be more important than the actual *plan* developed. Since no plan can ever remain intact throughout a campaign, Flournoy contends the important part in operationalizing post-conflict plans is to identify organizational relationships, capabilities, and disconnects. Flournoy presents an important concept, because it focuses on *relationships* and not *tasks*, since the tasks will remain fluid. Flournoy offers increased inter-agency planning and relationships as the best way to prepare for success in an uncertain environment. This concept is important because knowing who to deal with can be as important as recognizing the problem. This concept of integration can lead to changes in how policy is developed in the first place, which is discussed in the next section.

3. Changing U.S. Policy Through Better Integration

The final theme in civilian-military integration is how integration can benefit U.S. policy and influence stability operational procedures. This area of the literature asserts that improvements can be made in post-conflict situations by changing the way U.S. institutions perceive each other and the stabilization task environment. This completes the civil-military integration cycle that began with identifying cultural differences and continued with the gaps identified in the mechanics of integration. The analyses in this final theme of civil-military integration discusses how to make the policy process itself better.

In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, Robert Orr makes important distinctions between capacity and strategy in post-conflict operations. His work asserts that while additional response capacities are important, increasing capabilities is not sufficient for stabilization and reconstruction success. This view is important since it does not rely merely on calling for more funding, but analyzes the post-conflict task environment. The planning process must be robust enough to create

¹⁵ Michele Flournoy, “Interagency Strategy and Planning for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, 105-115 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

the proper integrative environment and have a strategy to accommodate increased resources. Orr posits that strategy must guide capacity, and that undirected capacity will only lead to inefficient post-conflict results. Specifically, Orr identifies three key transitions in primary responsibilities during post-conflict operations: military to civilian, U.S. to international actors, and international to indigenous actors. While Orr highlights the gaps in the first hand-off between military and civilian personnel, his framework is useful to think about the linkages between different organizations and their responsibilities.¹⁶

Andrew Natsios moves the linkage debate forward by considering the ideal relationship between civilian and military actors.¹⁷ Like Orr, he is concerned with linkages between civilian and military organizations and how effective linkages can be made more effective, observing that “the success of military strategy and the success of development policy have become mutually reinforcing. Development cannot effectively take place without the security that armed force provides. And security cannot ultimately occur until local populations view the promise of development as an alternative to violence.”¹⁸ Natsios offers nine principles for post-conflict environments and provides an opportunity for readers to appreciate the civil-military integration needed in each principle.¹⁹ Although there are clearly lead actors for some principles that may have very limited involvement for other actors, understanding their context and how they affect each other is critical to success. While Natsios’ framework is useful in suggesting similarities between civilian and military organizations regarding the nine principles, more developed examples would make the argument stronger.

¹⁶ Robert C. Orr, “An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, 289-304 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

¹⁷ Andrew S. Natsios, “The Nine Principles of Reconstruction and Development,” *Parameters* 35, no. 3 (Autumn 2005): 4-20.

¹⁸ Ibid., 6.

¹⁹ The nine principles are: creating a sense of *ownership* with the indigenous population; promoting institutions for indigenous *capacity building*; ensure programs and institutions are designed with *sustainability* in mind; *selectivity* ensures that scarce resources are used in accordance with strategic objectives; *assessment* encourages the understanding of local conditions and that best practices are highlighted; *results* ensures that goals are clearly defined and are measurable; *partnership* promotes an integrated response with governments, donors, and the international community; *flexibility* ensures that personnel and resources are capable of rapid changes to operational requirements; *accountability* advocates the creation of transparency together with checks-and-balances.

Marine Major and Naval Postgraduate School alumni Karl Rohr provides an intriguing framework for civil-military integration and security-development linkages with his concept of *progressive reconstruction*.²⁰ This model provides a useful example of how civilian-military integration can positively affect operational results in post-conflict environments. Rohr correctly identifies the often blurry line between combat and stability operations, asserting that the most effective stabilization operations are conducted concurrently and immediately as areas are secured. Indeed, Rohr's concepts support Sir Basil Liddell Hart's assertion that "if you concentrate exclusively on victory, with no thought for the after-effect...it is almost certain that the peace will be a bad one, containing the germs of another war."²¹ Rohr's progressive reconstruction concept refocuses combat from a purely military enterprise to a joint effort of military and civilian organizations. It holds particularly true that stabilization and reconstruction operations after the cessation of major combat operations require a closer coordination and understanding between military and civilian personnel, including their unique institutional characteristics.

B. INCREASING TRAINING AND EDUCATION

A second major theme framing the debates about improving U.S. efficiency in post-conflict environments involves a discussion of the role of training and educating people involved in stability operations. Although there are extensive calls in the literature for increased training, there is less consensus regarding the methods to be employed. There is an acknowledgement that U.S. institutions have failed to apply the lessons learned from previous operations to increase opportunities for success in current operations. Another important discussion involves creating a training culture for improving stability operations.

1. Failure of the "Lessons Learned" Concept

The United States still has much to learn from decades of post-conflict reconstruction endeavors. The dearth of institutional memory is a reason to emphasize

²⁰ Karl C. Rohr, "Progressive Reconstruction: Melding Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare with Nation Building and Stability Operations," *Marine Corps Gazette* 88 (April 2004): 48-50. See also Brian G. Watson, *Reshaping the Expeditionary Army to Win Decisively: The Case for Greater Stabilization Capacity in the Modular Force* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, August 2005).

²¹ B.H. Liddell Hart, *Strategy* (London: Farber and Farber, 1985), 353.

the need for better training and education for stabilization and reconstruction operations John Hamre, President of the Center for Strategic and International Studies and former U.S. Army Chief of Staff Gordon Sullivan raise an interesting dilemma: even when vital national security interests are involved, the United States relegates post-conflict missions to *ad hoc* responses.²² This means an inability to leverage all U.S. assets, making the response less effective. This situation reflects Orr's previous concern that strategy is limited by capacity. Without a robust and consistently-applied strategic plan, post-conflict integration will remain elusive and consist of isolated tactical initiatives that may work at cross-purposes. Retired Colonel Lloyd Matthews makes a similar argument when he asserts that, while the United States has no shortage of analyses and insights into the successes and failures of current military operations, we seem unable to apply these lessons to improve U.S. post-conflict capabilities.²³ The Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference's identification of a "continuing gap between theory and application"²⁴ may be the best summary of the shortfalls in the U.S. ability to apply "lessons learned."

2. Creating a Training and Education Culture

Many agencies and organizations in the United States do not value training and educational opportunities as much as the military. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Michele Flournoy asserts that "few agencies outside the Departments of Defense and State offer routine opportunities for training and education beyond initial, entry-level indoctrination and job-specific skills training. The training culture that exists in the U.S. military is truly an exception."²⁵ Lack of a training culture prevents an organization from viewing education and training as a method of improving results and advancement within the organization. Flournoy offers an interesting addition to the common call of more training for post-conflict personnel. Importantly, Flournoy identifies the need to emphasize the "lessons learned" concept. This theme is critical because it identifies a frequent failure in a two-part system. First, the training culture

²² John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, "Toward Postconflict Reconstruction," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 85-96.

²³ Lloyd J. Matthews, *Winning the War by Winning the Peace: Strategy for Conflict and Post-Conflict in the 21st Century*, Conference Report of the Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, April 13-15 2004.

²⁴ Ibid., 3.

²⁵ Ibid., 126-127.

must be improved. But more importantly, the increase in training must be accompanied by a culture that is able to link current operations to past training. If education and training are done in isolation and forgotten, then it is a waste of resources because the training has not made a difference. This is why many organizations continue with the frustration of starting from scratch every time. Therefore, a solution could include combining the military's training culture focused on current problems with an increase ability to remember the lessons of the past.²⁶

C. ASSESSING CURRENT DOD ASSETS

The final major area of the post-conflict literature involves how the military is structured internally. Specifically, this theme involves how the Department of Defense organizes its resources and assesses its capabilities. Much of this discussion involves how current military units and resources can be realigned for stability operations. There are two areas relevant to this study. First, there is a growing consensus that the United States has not correctly assessed the different challenges of post-conflict environments. As opposed to problems in applying the “lessons learned” concept, this involves matching and adapting U.S. capabilities to a new task environment. The second area important to this study is to determine if appropriate guidance exists to direct the military sufficiently to organize for success in post-conflict environments.

1. Situational Assessments

The Army's difficulty in stability operations is not a result of the Army being inflexible or incompetent. British Army General Nigel Aylwin-Foster's review of Operation Iraqi Freedom questions whether the Army is a victim of its own success. The Army's emphasis on conventional warfighting and adherence to centralized command may have held it back from the rapid innovation and flexibility required in post-conflict operations. His assertions about flexibility and the need for a more adaptable leadership cadre could lead to substantive improvements in stability operations.²⁷

Leonard Wong's U.S. Army Strategic Studies Institute analysis of Army company grade officers in Operation Iraqi Freedom offers an interesting contrast to Aylwin-

²⁶ Michele Flournoy, “Training and Education for Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” In *Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, ed. Robert C. Orr, 126-137 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

²⁷ Nigel Aylwin-Foster, “Changing the Army for Counterinsurgency Operations,” *Military Review* 85, no. 6 (November-December 2005): 2-15.

Foster's work, and paints a picture of junior officers succeeding despite their organizational structure and lack of guidance from civilian leadership. Wong's work acknowledges the success of Company Grade Officers in the ambiguous, unpredictable and complex nature of the post-conflict environment. While focusing exclusively on Operation Iraqi Freedom, Wong's review finds that the U.S. military can provide a valuable resource of leadership that has a proven track record of initiative, adaptability and independent actions in the absence of a clear consensus or agreement. Wong's work is also important because it identifies the effect of ambiguity on the effectiveness of U.S. forces in post-conflict operations. He asserts that being able to rethink the way the United States approaches current conflicts is a major barrier to post-conflict success.²⁸

The U.S. force structure was not optimized for stability operations. This may contribute to reluctance for the United States to be engaged in what is a long-term and expensive commitment during stabilization. Thomas Donnelly of the American Enterprise Institute asserts that America's penchant for stand-off weapons may contribute to the reluctance to become involved in operations involving mass or sustainability. Donnelly's work is important because it offers a good example of how U.S. policy can become inflexible, or how previously successful procedures will be used irregardless of their true applicability.²⁹ Patrick Donahoe of the U.S. Naval War College similarly asserts that a change in the way the military structures its resources is needed. Specifically, while the Cold War focused the military on traditional force-on-force battles and the need for officers trained to that standard, Donahoe argues the military now needs leaders that are capable of switching back-and-forth between major combat operations and stability operations.³⁰

2. Matching Taskings and Capabilities

Writers focusing upon tasks and capabilities question whether there is sufficient guidance to direct the military to organize for success in post-conflict environments. Numerous studies have suggested frameworks for internal assessments, such as the

²⁸ Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, July 2004).

²⁹ Thomas Donnelly, *The Military We Need: The Defense Requirements of the Bush Doctrine* (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute Press, 2005).

³⁰ Patrick J. Donahoe, "Preparing Leaders for Nationbuilding," *Military Review*, 84, no. 3 (May-June 2004): 24-26.

Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study.³¹ More importantly, the U.S. military's Universal Joint Task List provides the framework and lists the specific capabilities desired for stabilization operations. This list is the authoritative guidance to organize personnel, equipment, and resources for post-conflict operations within the Department of Defense.³²

A key finding from a November 2003 study from National Defense University contends that the continuing problems in the military with post-conflict operations is not a deficiency in the required skill-sets, but in how those resources are not leveraged and collected effectively within the military.³³ This argument asserts that the Defense Department's difficulties are organizational, not financial. Similar recommendations can be found in works such as the bi-partisan study sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, which found that a coherent response strategy is not possible without a more robust assessment of already-existing resources and personnel.³⁴

The Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study offers two dimensions for increasing U.S. effectiveness in stabilization and reconstruction operations.³⁵ First, the study suggests that future improvements could come from leveraging the military's management discipline. However, it must be noted that the same management, command and control, and goal-oriented results that have been a hallmark of past combat successes for the military may need to be adapted to the new task environment of stability operations. The second dimension regards the suggestion for a method to systematically analyze the knowledge and capabilities within the Department of Defense. The study's request for a full review of military assets matches this work's assertion that a complete review of Air Force leadership and training assets has not been undertaken and may provide valuable resources to the larger Department of Defense effort.

³¹ *Transition to and from Hostilities*, Defense Science Board 2004 Summer Study (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, December 2004). See also the addendum: *Transition to and from Hostilities: Supporting Papers*.

³² *Universal Joint Task List*, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, United States Department of Defense, Publication CJCSM 3500.04D, 1 August 2005.

³³ *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, ed. Hans Binnendijk and Stuart Johnson (Washington, D.C.: Center for Technology and National Security Policy, National Defense University, 12 November 2003).

³⁴ *Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction* (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 2003).

³⁵ *Transition to and from Hostilities*, 4-5.

While recent policy updates such as DOD Directive 3000.05³⁶ have directed that stability operations be placed on the same priority as major combat operations, there are already examples of the U.S. military services being directed to organize, train, and equip their forces for stability operations. The Universal Joint Task List is the authoritative strategic source for determining the tasks needed to accomplish the National Military Strategy. Specifically, the Universal Joint Task List “serve[s] as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations.”³⁷ Although many requirements described in the listing are applicable to stability operations, there are five tasks that this study finds particularly relevant:

- Cooperate with and support NGOs/PVOs
- Provide government-wide support
- Coordinate activities within the interagency process
- Conduct civil-military operations
- Foster interagency relations³⁸

The literature discussing improvements in U.S. capabilities for post-conflict environments is extensive, but tends to center around three themes: civilian-military integration, training and education, and the need for internal realignments within the Department of Defense. With these major literature areas identified, the remainder of this research will determine if there are any Air Force resources or personnel that can help answer these three issues. This work continues with an example of an Air Force training course that may answer many concerns raised in the stabilization literature.

³⁶ Gordon England, *Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations*, Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (Washington, D.C.: United States Department of Defense, 28 November 2005).

³⁷ *Universal Joint Task List*, A-1.

³⁸ Ibid. The following tasks are taken from the *Universal Joint Task List*: (1) Strategic Theater Tasks (ST) 8.2.11 and 8.2.12, p. 406-407; (2) Strategic National Task (SN) 8.2, p. 243; (3) SN 8.3, p. 246; (4) Operational Task (OP) 4.7.2, p. 517 and (5) SN 8 Chart, p. 709.

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III. INCREASING POST-CONFLICT TRAINING

“U.S. personnel...rarely have an opportunity to train with the representatives of the other U.S. agencies, non-governmental organizations, and the international actors with whom they will have to work in the field.”

-- Bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction³⁹

A. INTRODUCTION

There is no doubt that a continued U.S. military presence is required after the completion of major combat operations. Military personnel have also seen increasing taskings for nation building and peacekeeping activities. While there is little question regarding the preeminence of the U.S. in force-on-force battles with a traditional enemy, successes in post-conflict operations have been much harder to come by. Since a superpower or peer-competitor conflict is a limited possibility for the foreseeable future, it is critical for the U.S. military to address its shortcomings in conducting stabilization and reconstruction operations. However, defining success in stability operations as simply a “hearts and minds” issue fails to address more fundamental disconnects in U.S. policy and how the nation organizes its resources for post-conflict operations. The following sections address four major areas in an attempt to synthesize the trends from the stabilization and reconstruction literature with an Air Force training resource. The goal of this chapter is to assess the applicability of the Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course to stability operations.

The first major section discusses the issues concerning civilian-military integration and training. This review finds that the two issues are closely related. Improving integration and training can also address the military cultural issues that surround non-traditional roles for the military. The next section provides a review of the military’s responsiveness to its core taskings in the area of post-conflict operations. This discussion addresses the literature’s call for a complete review of DOD assets and how they are organized to meet the demands of stability operations. The third major section seeks to create a discussion in the Air Force by determining if there are any training resources that can synthesize the concerns and trends found in the literature review. Specifically, does the Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course satisfactorily answer the

³⁹ *Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 16.

questions of civilian-military integration and increasing relevant training for post-conflict environments? The final major area asserts that a spectrum of assistance could be developed that offers a scalable Air Force response to increase training in key post-conflict skill-sets. The current and following chapters begin to offer realistic options that support the assertion that anything less than a full consideration of all Department of Defense training and personnel resources means sub-optimal results for U.S. interests, the international community, and the exposure of U.S. personnel to unnecessary risks.

B. MILITARY ROLES AND THE CULTURE OF POST-CONFLICT OPERATIONS

The U.S. military has had extensive experience in what is commonly referred to as stabilization and reconstruction operations. This encompasses missions such as peacekeeping, nation building, infrastructure repair and a multitude of activities below major combat operations. Unfortunately, for all the successes in traditional combat operations, the inevitable post-conflict phase continues to baffle U.S. policymakers. Indeed, there is a significant gap between success in combat operations and the ability to control the stabilization phase.⁴⁰ However, there is now a growing realization that constabulary functions should not be viewed as a diversion of scarce resources, but represent a key determinant of the ultimate success of armed conflict.⁴¹ It is clear that the U.S. military will be called upon to ensure an area remains stable, nation-building progresses and autonomy is returned to indigenous populations. The U.S. inability to consistently perform in the stabilization and reconstruction realm should be viewed as seriously as its success in combat operations. The observations of Carafano and Dillon succinctly summarize the key issue:

The United States should be just as efficient in fighting for peace as in fighting battles. Winning the peace is part of winning wars. As in preparing for combat, sound planning for peace requires the right organizations, training, and preparation.⁴²

⁴⁰ Donnelly, 1.

⁴¹ Michael Mandelbaum, “Foreign Policy as Social Work,” *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, no. 1 (January/February 1996), p. 16.

⁴² James Jay Carafano and Dana R. Dillon, “Winning the Peace: Principles for Post-Conflict Operations,” Heritage Foundation Backgrounder no. 1859, 13 June 2005, 2.

There are currently two major obstacles preventing more efficient U.S. results in post-conflict operations. These two obstacles may be largely responsible for the problems of civilian-military integration and training identified in the literature. First, military culture and hence, military personnel perceptions of their roles in post-conflict operations must accommodate the realities of current missions. Secondly, increasing civilian and military integration will provide increased opportunities for success. The U.S. military is now actively directed to emphasize the mission area of stabilization and reconstruction. Unfortunately, the U.S. military's flexibility in changing from combat to stability operations and its integration with civilian institutions needs improvement.

1. The Department of Defense Culture Debate

The U.S. frequently relies on its military to provide the preponderance of implementation personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Unfortunately, military success in post-conflict operations has been sporadic, at best. Clearly, the military has unequalled expeditionary, equipment, and logistic capabilities. However, the current culture and organization of resources may not support the most efficient results in post-conflict environments. General Zinni's "stuckee" theory rings true for post-conflict operations when he asserts that there are no other realistic opportunities to fill the gap between major combat operations and the creation of a stable environment that has been returned to indigenous control.⁴³



Figure 1. The Gap in U.S. Capabilities

The 1990s saw the first significant involvements in peacekeeping operations. Unfortunately, the effort could best be described as *ad hoc*, with the military serving as executive agent with little planning or coordination with other agencies. Although the military was used because of its expeditionary capabilities, many agreed that civilians

⁴³ *Play to Win: Final Report of the bi-partisan Commission on Post-Conflict Reconstruction*, 7.

were more appropriate for nation building activities, particularly when humanitarian agencies were involved.⁴⁴ However, since the U.S. taxpayers fund the military's expeditionary capabilities to the sum of approximately \$400 billion per year, it may not be reasonable to expect the creation of a parallel capability in the civilian sector. Indeed, post-conflict operations are frequently bounded by political decisions geared towards how best to return indigenous control of a region after the military has secured an area. Therefore, the goal of stabilization and reconstruction is how to combine three aspects: military capabilities, organization and culture; civilian oversight and direction; and external-internal civil-military cooperation. It is clear that the optimal stability operation resolves these three conflicts by organizing the military more effectively and creating better integration between civilian and military capabilities. National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice summarizes this quandary succinctly when she commented that "there's nothing wrong with nation building, but not when it is done by the American military."⁴⁵ An assessment of all DOD training resources is in order to ensure the best combination of increasing skill-sets for post-conflict operations and increasing civilian-military cooperation. Increasing training and cooperation opportunities will allow a more efficient accomplishment of tasks along the post-conflict task continuum. Increased compatibility between civilian and military capabilities will allow planners to more easily identify the optimal mix of civilian and military functions. For example, some post-conflict tasks, like security, may require a preponderance of military resources. Other tasks may be better suited for civilian resources, like the development of courts. The better the coordination between civilian and military entities, the more easily planners can find the appropriate mix of civilian and military resources.

⁴⁴ Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, "Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department's Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization," *CRS Report for Congress*, Report RS22031, 19 January 2005, 2.

⁴⁵ Condoleezza Rice, "Foundation for a Nation," *Washington Post*, 29 October 2001, A-17.




Figure 2. Increasing Joint Training Provides More Flexibility

A reassessment of the military's organization and resources would provide a foundation for improving results in post-conflict environments. The military's "tradition of forgetting"⁴⁶ and its priorities must be changed for the new threats and taskings of the post-Cold War and post-9/11 environment. The U.S. military must more fully appreciate the importance of integration with NGOs and humanitarian organizations. Political and humanitarian considerations should replace military leadership as soon as possible, with the military in a supporting role. The military can provide a bridge between active hostilities and the ability of the indigenous population to settle differences through a political and legal process. While the military can provide resources, logistics, command and control and intelligence, it is "politics and politicians that must secure the changes and solutions to the causes of the conflict."⁴⁷ The U.S. military can begin making stabilization and reconstruction a higher priority by identifying resources and personnel most appropriate for post-conflict operations. Indeed, small changes in currently-existing training resources could provide valuable opportunities to allow an increase in civilian-military integration.

⁴⁶ Carafano and Dillon, 4.

⁴⁷ "Peacekeeping: What Works? America's Future Peacekeeping Policy," United States Department of State, Office of Research and Office of Politico-Military Analysis, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Conference Report, Meridian International Center, Washington, D.C., 1 February 1994, 3.

2. The Role of the Military

A substantive debate in the executive and legislative branches regarding the military's role in stability operations frequently centers around three core issues.⁴⁸ First, there are discussions regarding the suitability of military personnel for stabilization and reconstruction operations. Many analysts and senior officers would argue that there are currently questions of suitability of military personnel because of training, doctrine and philosophy of military personnel who are still being trained primarily for major combat operations. Many view this paradigm of training as oriented towards subduing and enemy in a non-permissive environment rather than cultivating the law enforcement and negotiating skills required in a post-conflict environment. Thomas Donnelly succinctly captures this policy dilemma when he asserts that “the preferred American way of war is to dash about the planet, zapping its enemies from afar, and then prepare for the next sally. It is, essentially, a raiding strategy on a global scale, the sort of approach more fitting for lesser powers than superpowers.”⁴⁹ Unfortunately, this continually leaves a gap in U.S. capabilities to control events after the completion of major combat operations. However, stabilization and reconstruction activities must begin before hostilities are completely finished. This means that military personnel may be integral to assuring the delivery of humanitarian assistance. Although some argue that a military presence confuses the objective/neutral status of civilian personnel, the need to ensure a secure and stable environment for these workers means that the military must address its effectiveness in stabilization missions and its integration with civilian capabilities and institutions.⁵⁰

The second core issue surrounding the debate of the military's role in stabilization and reconstruction operations is a discussion of the impact of this mission area on readiness to conduct major combat operations.⁵¹ With the realization that military involvement in post-conflict operations was not going to diminish, many began to reframe the debate not in terms of suitability or adequacy of the military, but that the

⁴⁸ The three core issues are discussed at length in Nina M. Serafino, “Peacekeeping and Related Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement,” *CRS Issue Brief for Congress*, Report IB94040, 27 October 2005.

⁴⁹ Donnelly, 51.

⁵⁰ Serafino, 5-7.

⁵¹ Ibid., 9.

current structure and size of the military did not allow for including the mission of stabilization and reconstruction along with the primary mission of major combat operations. This shifted the debate from the military's eschewment of non-traditional roles to an argument that the military was not structured to accomplish both roles simultaneously. However, it is not clear that a complete review of all DOD resources has occurred to ensure all military capabilities are being brought to bear for this emerging mission area.

The final major area of debate in the executive and legislative branches can be viewed in terms of a debate regarding deployment strains on equipment and personnel. While the previous issue was concerned with the structure of the military to meet its task environment, this issue deals with the cumulative strains of mission and structure on people and equipment. It is inescapable that a military currently dual-tasked to perform substantive post-conflict operations and be prepared to conduct major combat operations will continue to face strains on equipment and personnel. Specifically, stabilization and reconstruction taskings place additional strain on equipment and increase deployments for personnel in an all-volunteer force, making both less ready for major combat operations.⁵² Therefore, a significant debate is in order to determine roles and missions for the military. It is clear that the military will be needed in post-conflict operations. The question is the military's restructuring to better address this mission area. Robert Kaplan succinctly summarizes the imperative to develop a more integrated system of civilian and military capabilities when he asserts that the U.S. military has emerged as the "world's most effective emergency relief organization" because of its ability to deploy quickly, establish security and provide unequalled logistic support.⁵³ To be fully effective, the military must assess whether it is organizing its resources to meet its doctrinal requirements in stability operations.

The preceding discussion regarding the "roles and missions" debate and the need for greater civilian-military integration begs another question: What is the strategy and policy guidance for the military to organize itself for post-conflict operations? In addition, are there any similarities in taskings for post-conflict operations between the

⁵² Serafino, 10.

⁵³ Robert D. Kaplan, "U.S. Forces: The World's Best Relief Group," *New York Times*, 13 October 2005.

Department of Defense and other government agencies? The next major section analyzes possible areas of congruence in taskings for further consideration.

C. THE MILITARY'S STRATEGIC GUIDANCE FOR POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

1. Introduction

The debates over military structure, training and doctrine in addition to the need to integrate with other government agencies is intriguing because the disconnects would seem to stem not from a lack of strategic-level guidance or planning. Specifically, there are multiple sources of doctrine and policy that direct increases in training and coordination that should provide sufficient authority to better integrate stabilization and reconstruction operations into the military and to increase civilian-military cooperation. This review cites four main examples that direct increases in integration and training for post-conflict operations: the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL); the creation of the State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS); and the recent publishing of Department of Defense Directive 3000.05 (DODD 3000.05) and National Security Presidential Directive 44 (NSPD-44). The next task is to assess any similarities and determine any appropriate training or personnel resources that may be available within the Air Force.

2. The Universal Joint Task List

The first source of strategic guidance for stabilization operations is the UJTL. The UJTL is the authoritative strategic source for determining the tasks needed to accomplish the National Military Strategy. Specifically, the UJTL “serve[s] as the foundation for capabilities-based planning across the range of military operations.”⁵⁴ It is perhaps the most basic “to do” list for the U.S. military. This guidance also establishes a relational hierarchy of mandates that link specific tasks with the National Military Strategy (NMS). The UJTL describes the linkage between individual tasks and the NMS with the following definitions:

⁵⁴ *Universal Joint Task List*, A-1.

- **Strategy:** Over-arching military requirements to support National Security Strategy
- **End State:** The set of required conditions that defines achievement of the commander's objectives.
- **Effect:** A change to a condition, behavior, or degree of freedom.
- **Mission:** The task and purpose of a military operation
- **Capabilities:** ability to execute a specified course of action.
- **Task:** Specific skills allowing military to provide a capability and fulfill taskings⁵⁵

Therefore, the UJTL mandates specific tasks in support of the National Military Strategy in the following manner: ⁵⁶



Figure 3. Hierarchy of Mandates for the National Military Strategy

Although many requirements described in the UJTL are applicable to stabilization and reconstruction operations, the five tasks below are particularly relevant:

⁵⁵ *Universal Joint Task List*, A-4-6.

⁵⁶ Ibid. Based on Figure A-1 in *Universal Joint Task List*, A-7.

- Cooperate with and support NGOs/PVOs
- Provide government-wide support
- Coordinate activities within the interagency process
- Conduct civil-military operations
- Foster interagency relations⁵⁷

3. Public Law 108-447 and the State Department’s Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization

Additionally, many aspects of the UJTL are paralleled by the Congressional intent of Public Law 108-447, which endorsed the creation of S/CRS.⁵⁸ These two developments can provide synergies for improvements in stabilization and reconstruction operations. This new ambassador-level agency is intended to answer a perceived lack of oversight over the transition from active hostilities to stable control by the local population.⁵⁹ Specifically, there are four major task areas outlined in PL 108-447 that are designed to improve U.S. results in stabilization and reconstruction operations:

- Determine and document resources outside the military
- Develop non-military responses to post-conflict crises
- Serve as the executive agent for U.S. response by coordinating U.S. response plans
- Coordinate training of civilian personnel⁶⁰

4. Department of Defense Directive 3000.05

A third strategic reference for post-conflict operations is found in Acting Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England publication of DODD 3000.05 in November 2005. This directive is designed to ensure that “stability operations are a core U.S. military mission...[that] shall be given priority comparable to combat operations.”⁶¹ Importantly,

⁵⁷ The following tasks are taken from the *Universal Joint Task List*: (1) Strategic Theater Tasks (ST) 8.2.11 and 8.2.12, 406-407; (2) Strategic National Task (SN) 8.2, 243; (3) SN 8.3, 246; (4) Operational Task (OP) 4.7.2, 517; and (5) SN 8 Chart, 709.

⁵⁸ Provisions for S/CRS can be found in Public Law 108-447, “Consolidated Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2005.”

⁵⁹ Nina M. Serafino and Martin A. Weiss, “Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on Civilian Capabilities,” *CRS Report for Congress*, Report RL32862, 28 June 2005, 1. An updated version, dated 26 January 2006, also provides a good summary of the creation of S/CRS.

⁶⁰ Serafino and Weiss, “Peacekeeping and Post-Conflict Capabilities: The State Department’s Office for Reconstruction and Stabilization,” 5.

⁶¹ England, 2.

this policy provides clear guidance to increase training and integration in U.S. government agencies and aide organizations. Some specific highlights include:

- Coordinate DoD relations with the Department of State's Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
- Identify DoD-wide stability operations capabilities
- Develop a process to facilitate information sharing for stability operations among the DoD Components, and relevant U.S. Departments and Agencies...NGOs, and members of the Private Sector
- Develop opportunities for personnel from other U.S. Departments and Agencies, foreign governments, International Organizations, and NGOs to participate, as appropriate, in DoD training related to stability operations⁶²

5. National Security Presidential Directive 44

The final example of strategic guidance for stabilization operations impacting the Department of Defense is the publication of NSPD-44 on 7 December 2005.⁶³ This directive identifies the Secretary of State (as delegated to the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization) as the executive agent for deliberate and crisis planning for stabilization and reconstruction operations and to ensure that the capabilities of individual agencies are combined effectively. The document specifically directs that “the Secretaries of State and Defense will integrate stabilization and reconstruction contingency plans with military contingency plans...[and] will develop a general framework for fully coordinating stabilization and reconstruction activities and military operations at all levels.”⁶⁴ Although there are numerous and wide-ranging responsibilities assigned to the Department of State, they can be collapsed into five general areas of responsibility:

- Develop detailed contingency plans for integrated United States Government reconstruction and stabilization efforts

⁶² England, para. 5.1.2, 5.1.4, 5.1.9, and 5.3.5.

⁶³ George Bush, *National Security Presidential Directive/NSPD-44*, 7 December 2005. Available through the website of The Partnership for Effective Peacekeeping at www.effectivepeacekeeping.org/docs/usgov/Directive%20NSPD44.pdf. Accessed 1 March 2006.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 5.

- Coordinate United States Government responses for reconstruction and stabilization with the Secretary of Defense
- Coordinate reconstruction and stabilization activities...[with] international and regional organizations, nongovernmental organizations, and private sector entities
- Lead United States Government development of a strong civilian response capability including necessary surge capabilities
- Identify lessons learned and integrate them into operations⁶⁵

It is clear that the “fog of peace” present in post-conflict operations create opportunities for confusion and duplication of effort.⁶⁶ Most seriously, ineffective stability operations policy leads to unnecessary risks for personnel and a waste of scarce resources for the U.S. taxpayer. Fortunately, there appears to be a high level of congruence in policy directives and congressional intent summarized in the preceding review. The next task is to evaluate any pre-existing training resources that can be used to satisfy the concerns of the post-conflict literature and the policy directives for U.S. agencies tasked with stabilization operations. The next major area of this research assesses one possibility.

D. THE AIR FORCE ON-SCENE COMMANDERS COURSE

Multiple after-action reports and analyses have asserted that stabilization and reconstruction requires a different skill-set than major combat operations.⁶⁷ The Air Force’s On-Scene Commanders Course addresses this need. Expanding attendance within DOD and including non-DOD personnel will increase the pool of personnel with skill-sets for stability operations and would increase understanding between civilian and military personnel.

Four works are particularly representative of the discussions regarding the importance of education and training for success in stabilization operations. In “Educating International Security Practitioners,” Smith *et al* provide a thorough review of the nexus of military education and the requirements twenty-first century security

⁶⁵ Bush, “Responsibilities of the Department of State,” para. 3, 5, 6, 9, and 10.

⁶⁶ Manfred K. Rotermund, *The Fog of Peace: Finding the End-State of Hostilities* (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, November 1999), 47-52.

⁶⁷ See especially: Blank, Carafano and Dillon, Donahoe, Flavin, Rotermund, Smith and Kaufman *et al*, Watson, Wong , Wong and Gerras *et al*.

environment.⁶⁸ Their review finds that major changes are necessary to ensure U.S. forces have the capability to make transitions from war to peace. Perhaps more powerfully, Wong *et al* asserts in “Strategic Leadership Competencies” that an integrated leadership development program should be developed to address the requirements of post-conflict operations.⁶⁹ In addition, Wong’s *adaptive leader* concept argues that stabilization and reconstruction duties may be making better officers, albeit not in their traditional specialties.⁷⁰ The Fifteenth Annual Strategy Conference hosted by the U.S. Army’s Strategic Studies Institute asserts that an overwhelming gap exists between analysis and prescriptions for success and operational results. Matthews’ summary provides a convincing argument for increasing training and education opportunities for personnel engaged in stabilization and reconstruction operations and that new leadership capabilities must be created to address stability operations.⁷¹ Finally, Flavin describes the critical importance of successful civilian-military operations in his review of the first year of Operation Enduring Freedom. Specifically, he describes the importance of civilian-military cooperation to facilitate the transition between military security-focused operations and civilian nation-building and stability operations.⁷²

1. Specific Course Elements

The On-Scene Commanders Course covers the topics (and others) listed in *Figure 4* via a four-day training workshop involving seminar presentations, hands-on exercises and presentations by subject matter experts, with an average of 14-17 students.

⁶⁸ James M. Smith, Daniel J. Kaufman, et al, “Educating International Security Practitioners: Preparing to Face the Demands of the 21st Century International Security Environment,” United States Army Strategic Studies Institute, July 2001.

⁶⁹ Leonard Wong and Stephen Gerras, et al, “Strategic Leadership Competencies,” United States Army Strategic Studies Institute, September 2003.

⁷⁰ Leonard Wong, *Developing Adaptive Leaders: The Crucible Experience of Operation Iraqi Freedom* (Carlisle, PA: United States Army Strategic Studies Institute, July 2004), 7.

⁷¹ Matthews, 1-3.

⁷² Flavin, *v.* See also “Civil Military Operations,” NATO Allied Joint Publication 9-0, Para. 0212.

Major Topics: On-Scene Commanders Course

- Major accident / disaster response policies
- Legal / media orientation
- Medical responses
- Hazardous materials accident responses
- Mishap investigation and reporting
- Terrorism
- Explosive ordinance identification and disposal
- Post traumatic stress debriefing
- Office of Special Investigation
- Contingency contracting

Figure 4. Major Topics of the On-Scene Commanders Course

The course was created in 1980 during the aftermath of a Titan II Intercontinental Ballistic Missile accident in Damascus, Arkansas. The intent of the course was to create a better crisis management response and leadership capability and to teach leaders how to integrate various response agencies and seeks to address the following goals:

- Provide emergency/contingency response training.
- Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response.
- Teach command and control functions during emergency/contingency situations.
- Teach situation assessment, communications, planning, public affairs and logistics support.⁷³

The On-Scene Commanders Course currently trains approximately 400 people per year through a combination of in-residence instruction at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama and various traveling teams that provide instruction to sponsoring organizations within the Air Force. The Air Force is the only DOD agency that provides a separate

⁷³ On-Scene Commanders Course Website, Ira C. Eaker College for Professional Development, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. Available at http://commandersschool.maxwell.af.mil/On_Scene_Commanders_Homepage.htm. Accessed on 5 October 2005.

academic experience that teaches crisis management and integrated response skills.⁷⁴ The training includes how to respond to contingency and crisis situations by integrating and managing various responding agencies, including civilian resources, as appropriate. It is clear that a dialogue must begin to determine how to expand this course to more personnel, particularly those involved in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

2. Major Benefits

The On-Scene Commanders Course can provide a valuable contribution to post-conflict operations for several reasons. In addition to following Donahoe's assertion that leaders are needed that can quickly transition from combat to stability operations,⁷⁵ there are numerous reasons why expanding this Air Force resource makes sense for the stabilization and reconstruction community. First, the On-Scene Commanders Course would help answer the problem of multiple authorities, cultures and priorities by providing a standardized experience for post-conflict personnel. Using a common framework as provided for in this class would allow responding agencies to establish better understandings of capabilities, authorities, and command-and-control issues. An integrated approach like the On-Scene Commanders Course would provide increased flexibility and response capability from the wide range of U.S. agencies involved in post-conflict operations. The opportunity to learn common practices and integration procedures would be increased by the course and provide a chance to exchange ideas in a week-long seminar. Indeed, this Air Force resource may go a long way to answering the taskings of DODD 3000.05 as well as Binnendijk and Johnson's call for civilian agencies to create new programs to better integrate their capabilities and appreciate the "maze of competing and conflicting entities."⁷⁶ The course could also provide a valuable training baseline for deployable civilian teams, perhaps as a capstone course prior to deployment.

A second benefit of the On-Scene Commanders Course would allow the civilian community to leverage the best practices of the Air Force. It would support a Council on Foreign Relations-sponsored assessment suggesting the creation of additional civilian-military training to increase cooperation. Using this pre-existing training would also

⁷⁴ Niel Krosner, Course Director, United States Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course, Interview by William D. Fischer, Telephone and e-mail, 5 October 2005.

⁷⁵ Donahoe, 26.

⁷⁶ *Transforming for Stabilization and Reconstruction Operations*, 105-106.

allow entities such as the Department of State to solidify its role as executive agent without expending unnecessary funds to create training programs from scratch.⁷⁷ In addition, an expanded audience for the On-Scene Commanders Course finds agreement with the Defense Science Board's 2004 Summer Study, "Transition to and from Hostilities," which stated that increased inter-agency cooperation is needed between the Departments of Defense and State.⁷⁸ It is clear this Air Force resource would allow the military to increase training for, and appreciation of, stabilization and reconstruction tasks while helping create similar synergies in the civilian sector and making this skill-set a core competency for the Department of State.

A third benefit of expanding attendance would involve an appreciation for what Karl Rohr has termed *progressive reconstruction*. The On-Scene Commanders Course could be used to increase capabilities in the crisis management and integrative skills needed in post-conflict operations. By combining military and civilian attendees from the entire spectrum of supporting agencies, the course could increase the understanding for an increasingly blurry line between combat and stability operations and that the most effective stabilization operation does not occur after active hostilities have ceased, but are conducted concurrently and immediately as objectives are secured.⁷⁹

Perhaps most importantly, a fourth major benefit to increasing the use of the On-Scene Commanders Course would involve a direct support of the initiative to create a pool of deployable civilian teams that are well-versed in crisis-management and integration of multiple response agencies. It would also substantively contribute to the creation of a "U.S. training center for complex contingency operations."⁸⁰ Civilian attendance at the On-Scene Commanders Course could create deployable expertise that can easily integrate with other agencies within Rohr's *progressive reconstruction* concept. Course materials provided by the Air Force could assist in the creation of a national training center for stabilization and reconstruction.

⁷⁷ "In the Wake of War: Improving U.S. Post-Conflict Capabilities," ed. William Nash, Report of an Independent Task Force, Council on Foreign Relations, 2005, 11 and *xiii*.

⁷⁸ *Transition to and from Hostilities*, *vi*.

⁷⁹ Rohr, 48. See also Watson, 9-10.

⁸⁰ John J. Hamre, "Civilian Post-Conflict Reconstruction Capabilities," Testimony Before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 3 March 2004, 4-5.




Figure 5. An Air Force Training Resource to Answer Multiple Doctrine and Policy Directives

The Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course can simultaneously satisfy the requirements of the UJTL, Congressional intent as operationalized in PL 108-447 and the creation of S/CRS, and the recent publication of DODD 3000.05 and NSPD-44.

3. A Spectrum of Assistance for Training

There are gaps in civilian-military cooperation and the military's structure for stability operations. Although strategic-level guidance exists for civilian and military personnel involved in post-conflict environments, not all resources are being considered. Understanding the deliverables is not the problem, it is the ability to leverage already-existing assets to maximize efficiency and results. The Air Force's On-Scene Commanders Course could provide answers to many of these issues. Modifying the Air Force's course and creating a *spectrum of assistance* can provide the U.S. with the training and flexibility needed to succeed in this growing mission area. The following are options to consider for using the On-Scene Commanders Course to increase U.S. capabilities in post-conflict operations:

- Increase capacity at Air University for additional in-residence attendees
- Increase use of mobile training teams to deliver course material to wider audiences
- Create a distance learning experience managed by Air University, already an expert at delivering education via correspondence
- Make course materials available to other agencies to modify as they see fit

The On-Scene Commanders Course teaches crisis management and interagency cooperation that can be valuable to anyone involved with post-conflict duties. In the final analysis, this pre-existing and underutilized resource provides three key benefits. First, the course content answers many of the issues and shortfalls raised by the stabilization and reconstruction literature. Second, the course answers the mandates outlined by the UJTL, supports Congressional intent as outlined in documents such as PL 108-447 and the creation of the S/CRS function in the Department of State, and matches the intent of DODD 3000.05 and NSPD-44. Finally, this course would provide an opportunity to expand civilian-military cooperation and understanding in a critical mission area. In this case, the U.S. may already have the tools its needs to solve a compelling and enduring problem. It is time to discuss expanding the parameters of the Air Force's On-Scene

Commanders Course. With a potential training source identified to increase U.S. capabilities in post-conflict operations, the next task is to determine if any personnel resources exist in the Air Force that have similar skills.

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IV. PERSONNEL RESOURCES FOR POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

“Because post-conflict...operations are likely of long duration and will vary in intensity, planners must account for the capabilities required to achieve campaign objectives.”

-- US National Military Strategy⁸¹

A. INTRODUCTION

This paper began with identifying the three major themes of improving U.S. success in post-conflict environments. It continued with an analysis of a potential training resource within the Air Force that could answer many of the literature concerns. This training example also appears to satisfy many congressional and State Department concerns for increasing efficiency in stabilization operations. Most importantly, this training example matches several of the mandates found in the recently released Department of Defense Directive 3000.05. This paper now looks at personnel resources within the Air Force to determine any potential resources for post-conflict operations.

This chapter continues the work of previous chapters in three major areas. To begin with, an overview of major problems in recent stability operations is in order. Determining the major problems may assist in identifying the proper personnel to increase mission accomplishment. The second major area looks at how Air Force resources are organized at the wing-level to determine the likely location for resources that may be able to contribute to post-conflict operations. Specifically, this research assesses how major capabilities are organized at the wing-level by reviewing organizational structures and mission statements. The final area will review senior officers within the Air Force wing-level structure to assess similarities between roles and responsibilities and the trends identified in the previous chapters. In particular, Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders are seen as a possible resource of critical skills for stabilization operations. Specifically, this chapter will conclude with a review of Mission

⁸¹ “The National Military Strategy of the United States of America: A Strategy for Today; A Vision for Tomorrow,” United States Department of Defense, January 2004, 21.

Support Group Commander availability, qualifications, and training by reviewing primary source data from the Military Personnel Data System (MILPDS).

B. MAJOR CONCERNS IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS

While U.S. success in traditional, force-on-force battles is widely acknowledged, similar results in stabilization and reconstruction have been far less consistent. This section begins with an adaptation of David Galula's counterinsurgency model to assist in understanding the disconnects with success in combat operations and the stability environment. It continues with a brief review of the major concerns in post-conflict operations such as Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although Galula's work is concerned with the factors affecting counterinsurgency warfare, the models aid understanding the disconnect between success in traditional combat operations and effectiveness in post-conflict operations.⁸² Galula offers two explanations why there is little confusion over major combat operations but there continues to be a lack of consensus during stability operations. The first element is the existence of a clear goal and defined tasks. Specifically, the target for the U.S. is the defeat of the opposing military and occupation of its former area of control. Galula asserts that this lends itself to clear lines of authority and execution, with the political goals set by the government and the execution of the policy clearly within the military span of control. However, Galula is correct that post-conflict environments do not have such clear objectives, consensus and delineated tasks. His work provides a succinct summation of the difficulties of post-conflict operations when he observes that "transition from peace to war is very gradual, the issue is never clear...military and political actions cannot be separated."⁸³ With Galula's framework as a guide, the next task is to review the major trends preventing a more complete success for the U.S. in stability operations.

U.S. difficulties in post-conflict operations are a constant subject in popular media, government reports, and research institutes. The common themes of security and infrastructure repair emerge as frequent shortfalls from the post-conflict analyses. For example, the Government Accountability Office found that Security was one of the major barriers to effective reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan and that long-term

⁸² David Galula, *Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger, 1964).

⁸³ Ibid., 84.

infrastructure projects were hampered by limited strategic guidance and funding.⁸⁴ The review specifically noted that “deteriorating security...in particular jeopardized U.S. reconstruction efforts, and efforts to counter these obstacles have had little success.”⁸⁵ In addition, the report asserted that “the criminality of the warlords’ private armies continued to destabilize the country and impede reconstruction.”⁸⁶ A review of the variables assessed in the Brookings Institution’s *Afghanistan Index* and *Iraq Index* also provide a sobering account of the prevalence of security and infrastructure concerns in these two operations. For example, the *Afghanistan Index* tracks thirty-one security and infrastructure variables and only seven indicators of political opinion and stability.⁸⁷ A more sobering view of the pervasive impact of security and infrastructure concerns is the *Iraq Index* tracking of forty-three security indicators and 26 infrastructure variables, but only sixteen indicators of political opinion and stability.⁸⁸ Andrew Krepinevich’s assessment of the Iraq war focuses almost exclusively on how to increase security. His concept of the oil spot provides a convincing linkage of security and infrastructure concerns in a post-conflict environment. In summary, this concept asserts that, rather than trying to be everywhere at once, stabilization forces should focus on securing an initially limited area (the oil spot) and expand that area as security and infrastructure is stabilized. This “enduring level of security...will facilitate reconstruction.”⁸⁹ Finally, a recent Government Accounting Office (GAO) report highlighted a significant link between security problems and deficiencies in reconstructing infrastructure, stating that “poor security conditions

⁸⁴ David Gootnick et al, *Afghanistan Reconstruction: Deteriorating Security and Limited Resources Have Impeded Progress; Improvements in U.S. Strategy Needed*, United States General Accounting Office Report 04-403, June 2004. See also reports such as Kenneth Katzman, *Afghanistan: Post-War Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy*, Congressional Research Service Report RL30588 (Washington, D.C.: United States Congress Congressional Research Service, 26 July 2005).

⁸⁵ Ibid., 39.

⁸⁶ Ibid., 42.

⁸⁷ Michael E. O’Hanlon and Adriana Lins de Albuquerque, *Afghanistan Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Taliban Afghanistan* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 19 May 2005).

⁸⁸ Michael E. O’Hanlon and Nina Kamp, *Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction & Security in Post-Saddam Iraq* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 9 January 2006). The author accounted for the variables of “Trained Judges” and “Felony Cases Resolved in Iraqi Courts” in the Political category rather than the Infrastructure category, as it was listed in the report.

⁸⁹ Andrew F. Krepinevich, “The War In Iraq: An Interim Assessment,” Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. Prepared for the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Net Assessment. Contract no. DASW01-02-D-0014-0034, November 2005, 90.

have slowed reconstruction and increased costs.”⁹⁰ The report also asserts that “contractor officials acknowledged that security costs have diverted a considerable amount of reconstruction resources and have led to canceling or reducing the scope of some reconstruction projects.”⁹¹

With the acknowledgement that security and infrastructure are two of the primary concerns in post-conflict operations, the next task is to review applicable Air Force organizations and leadership for potential use in addressing these concerns.

C. THE AIR FORCE MISSION SUPPORT GROUP

This research now endeavors to review Air Force organizational assets to determine if there are any parallels with the issues of infrastructure and security identified in the previous review. Specifically, this section will review how the Air Force organizes its personnel and major functions at the wing-level. A review of the Air Force basic organizational doctrine and organizational charts will determine how the major functions are organized. This research will then attempt to identify any major skill-sets within those organizational constructs for post-conflict operations.

This research has identified security and infrastructure as major areas of concern for post-conflict operations. The current task is to determine how the Air Force organizational structure addresses similar concerns to determine any useful arrangements for post-conflict operations. Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.4 (AFDD 2-4.4) outlines the Air Force’s concepts for infrastructure, facilities, and combat support.⁹² Specifically, this document outlines guiding principles for commanders to “provide for the right mix of resources and capabilities at the right time and right place to support operational or strategic objectives.”⁹³ In this vein, AFDD 2-4.4 describes the critical roles and functions of Air Force infrastructure and support. There are nine functions that have particular applicability to the infrastructure and security concerns previously identified in post-conflict environments:⁹⁴

⁹⁰ Joseph A. Christoff, “Rebuilding Iraq: Stabilization, Reconstruction, and Financing Challenges,” Testimony before the United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Report GAO-06-428T, 8 February 2006, 9.

⁹¹ Ibid., 8.

⁹² “Bases, Infrastructure, and Facilities,” Air Force Doctrine Document 2-4.4, 13 November 1999.

⁹³ Ibid., 47.

⁹⁴ Ibid., 2-3. The nine functions are adapted from Table 1, “Functions and Roles.”

Civil Engineer: Provides general and combat engineering; explosive ordinance disposal; disaster preparedness; environmental management; major accident recovery; fore protection; and mitigation and recovery from the effects of weapons of mass destruction (including nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons), peacetime emergencies, and terrorist incidents.

Communications and Information: Provides the capabilities to create, store, retrieve, fuse, display, disseminate, and dispose of information. This capability includes communications, information resources management, information warfare support, knowledge management through records management, postal support, visual information, and computer support.

Contracting: Provides the means for basic life support, including billeting, food, water, and transportation. Negotiates leasing and renting contracts, provides local services, and assists in rebuilding infrastructure, bridges, and roads.

Logistics Plans: Responsible for integrating logistics functions as well as base support, deployment, reception, resupply, and redeployment planning.

Personnel: Provides airmen with the proper skills, training, and experience required to accomplish the mission. Builds and sustains accession, development, and workforce management plans and programs needed to allow all functions to meet their missions with effective human resources. Provides accountability of in-garrison and deployed forces. Provides commanders reachback capabilities to increase or decrease available personnel.

Security Forces: Provides forces for air base defense, security, and law enforcement services. Provides protection to weapons systems, personnel, and infrastructure.

Services: Provides food service, mortuary affairs, lodging, fitness, retail sales and services, laundry and dry cleaning services, and recreational opportunities while maintaining a sense of community and quality of life.

Supply: Stocks, stores, and issues assets that support operations and the repair of assets.

Transportation: Provides timely delivery, resupply, retrograde, and vehicle support.

With these basic security and infrastructure capabilities identified, the next task is to determine how these functions are organized within the Air Force. Determining the organizational location for these functions may help identify key leaders responsible for managing these functions and, potentially, provide insights into how the Air Force manages these functions.

Air Force Instruction 38-101 prescribes standard organizational structures for the Air Force.⁹⁵ This document provides the most detail for the Standard Wing organization, which is the primary means by which the Air Force “generates and employs combat capability.”⁹⁶ A more complete discussion of the organization of Air Force capabilities at the wing-level can be found in Program Action Directive 02-05 (PAD 02-05). This plan outlines the Combat Wing Organization Structure and describes how the Air Force capabilities that have applications for post-conflict operations (described from AFDD 2-4.4) are organized in the Mission Support Group:⁹⁷




Figure 6. Typical Air Force Combat Wing Structure

⁹⁵ “Manpower and Organization,” Air Force Instruction 38-101, 21 April 2004.

⁹⁶ Ibid., para 3.3, 14.

⁹⁷ “Implementation of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force Direction to Establish a New Combat Wing Organization Structure,” United States Air Force Program Action Directive 02-05, 20 June 2002, Appendix I to Annex A, A-I-1.

Therefore, since the Air Force has organized its security and infrastructure capabilities in the Mission Support Group, there may be leadership assets in this organization that can contribute to stabilization operations and add to the potential contributions already identified from the On-Scene Commanders Course.

D. MISSION SUPPORT GROUP COMMANDERS

Since the previous section identified parallels between the infrastructure and security concerns of post-conflict environments and the Air Force's Mission Support Groups, a review of the senior officers that command these organizations is in order. Specifically, this section involves an analysis of primary source data from MILPDS that outlines critical concerns if this resource is to be considered for a new mission area. To begin with, this research will determine how many current and graduated Mission Support Group Commanders are in the Air Force inventory. This will provide a general idea of how many officers would potentially be available to provide expertise in this area. The next area will review how many years the average officer has been engaged in Mission Support Group issues. In particular, the years spent assigned to Mission Support Group-related positions are reviewed to determine the level of experience officers have in these issues. A third area of consideration is assignment to joint-service positions. This can be seen as a key indicator of experience in an environment that requires the integration of multiple organizational constructs and may provide an indicator of experience with multiple constituencies and organizational priorities and cultures. A fourth area assessed is the officers' time left in service after completing a tour of duty as a Mission Support Group Commander. Since the Air Force limits the number of years officers can serve, and the position of Mission Support Group Commander is a senior command position, it will be necessary to determine if there is sufficient time left in these officers' careers to leverage their experience as Mission Support Group Commanders. The fifth area of consideration is the advanced education of these officers to determine any opportunities to leverage their education as well as experience. This final area will attempt to collapse graduate education into broad categories to determine any applicability for post-conflict environments.

1. Numbers and Locations

A query of MILPDS was conducted to determine the number of senior officers with experience commanding Mission Support Groups. Officers commanding a Mission Support Group are assigned an Air Force Specialty Code (AFSC) of 30C0. This research utilized the AFSC of 30C0 to determine how many officers in the current Air Force inventory possess this experience. The results are based on a query of MILPDS with data current as of 4 January 2006.⁹⁸ The query results were collapsed into individual experience reports in the Single Uniform Retrieval Format, commonly referred to as *SURFs*. These products give a one-page career summary on an individual, highlighting key career aspects for analysis.

The analysis of the system query revealed 76 officers currently commanding the Mission Support Groups that support the Air Force's 105 major active wings.⁹⁹ Perhaps more importantly, the data reveal the existence of 165 officers that have completed their command tours and have remained in the Air Force inventory. These results suggest the existence of a significant senior leadership resource that is experienced in managing security and infrastructure issues that may prove valuable in stabilization and reconstruction environments. The next task is to determine the level of experience these officers possess with Mission Support Group issues. The following two sections seek to answer relevant questions regarding experience.

2. Mission Support Group Experience

This research now concerns itself with the question of experience in Mission Support Group issues that have already been found to have significant parallels in the stabilization and reconstruction literature and the Air Force's Combat Wing organizational structure. Specifically, this research assesses how many years officers were typically assigned to Mission Support Group-related duties and the amount of command experience at the squadron-level as exhibited by the organizations listed under the Mission Support Group in *Figure 6*.

⁹⁸ This analysis of Mission Support Group Commanders was made possible by the Headquarters Air Mobility Command Directorate of Personnel Systems Analysis Branch, Scott Air Force Base, Illinois. All data are based on a SURF query with data from 4 January 2006.

⁹⁹ Listing of major active wings taken from a listing provided by the office of the Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, Washington, D.C., 23 March 2005. The difference in numbers exists because a Mission Support Group can act as part of a "host" wing, supporting other wings at the same installation that are frequently referred to as "tenants."

The research reveals that the 76 current commanders have an average of 13.7 years of assignments in Mission Support Group-related duties. In addition, 56 commanders have previously served as subordinate commanders of organizations outlined in Figure 6, with 21 officers commanding a Mission Support Group organization on more than one occasion. Although the research found that 20 current commanders were in their first Mission Support Group-related command as the group commander, this set typically found their prior command experience in other Air Force organizations. In addition, 40 of the 76 current commanders have been promoted to their current or previous ranks early. While being selected for military command is a clear indicator of ability and success by itself, the data indicating the prevalence if *below the promotion zone* officers provides another indication of the quality of these officers. In sum, these numbers suggest a highly experienced group that may be capable of applying their current skill-set from their Mission Support Groups to stabilization and reconstruction environments.

3. Joint Service Experience

Experience in a joint service and multi-agency environment has clear value to post-conflict environments and is a skill-set receiving great attention in the stabilization and reconstruction literature reviewed earlier. The research into Mission Support Group Commanders also provided encouraging results into this area of experience. The 76 current commanders contain 44 officers that have been assigned to joint and multi-agency duty. These officers have an average of 2.8 years in these positions. In addition, 16 of the officers have been assigned to more than one joint duty position. This research appears to support that Mission Support Group Commanders have extensive command experience in key aspects of post-conflict operations and have a great deal of experience in integrating different organizations as represented in the extent of experience in joint service and multi-agency assignments.

4. Time Available After Command Tour

The results to this point seem to indicate the existence of a highly experienced pool of Air Force officers that have skills applicable to stabilization and reconstruction operations. However, a complete analysis is not possible without reviewing the availability of these officers. Therefore, the next task of this research will be to assess

how much time these officers would be available to leverage their experience from their command tours in the Mission Support Group.

The current pool of commanders has been in commissioned service for an average of 23.91 years. Since Air Force colonels are normally limited to 30 years of service,¹⁰⁰ this leaves an average of 5.84 years to leverage this significant experience after completion of the Mission Support Group command tour.¹⁰¹ Therefore, this pool of commanders is experienced in a great deal of stabilization and reconstruction issues and also have time available left in their Air Force careers to leverage that experience with assignments after their command tour ends.

5. Advanced Education Trends

A final area of analysis involves the assessment of advanced academic degrees. While it is not surprising that 100% of the current commanders have advanced academic degrees, it is worth noting that 57 of the 76 have two or more advanced degrees. This suggests a highly motivated and educated cadre of officers. The graduate education of these officers can be collapsed into four major areas:

- National Security Policy 48%
- Public Policy / Political Science / Liberal Arts 20%
- Civil Engineering / Technical Degrees 17%
- Business 15%

This high level of graduate education, combined with the factors previously discussed, begins to build a picture of a highly capable group of officers with highly relevant skills that have, most importantly, time remaining in their Air Force careers to potentially provide assistance to improving U.S. capabilities in stabilization and reconstruction operations.

6. A Resource for Post-Conflict Environments?

The previous discussion of Mission Support Group Commanders provides an intriguing possibility for increasing U.S. success in stabilization and reconstruction operations for five reasons as outlined in *Figure 7*:

¹⁰⁰ “Service Retirements,” Air Force Instruction 36-3203, 12 September 2003, Table 4.1, Rule 5.

¹⁰¹ The discrepancy between averages for years of commissioned service and years left until the 30-year mark are a result of below-the-zone promotions and when an officer is assigned during their tenure as a colonel.

Mission Support Group Commanders: An Untapped Resource?

- **Already-existing leadership resource**
 - 76 current and 165 previous commanders
- **Experienced in security and infrastructure issues**
 - 13.7 years in related duties
 - 74% have related previous command experience
 - 28% have multiple related previous command tours
- **Motivated and recognized potential**
 - 53% are below-the-zone
 - 100% have advanced degrees
 - 75% have two or more advanced degrees
- **Joint and multi-agency experience**
 - 58% have joint duty experience
 - 21% have more than one joint assignment
- **Availability**
 - 5.84 years after command tour is complete

Figure 7. Summary of Mission Support Group Commanders

The previous discussions regarding the stabilization and reconstruction literature, the On-Scene Commanders Course, and Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders allows a modification of the model from *Figure 5* to include a more complete paradigm. In particular, it is important to note that Mission Support Commanders attend the On-Scene Commanders Course as a requirement of assuming their positions.¹⁰² Therefore, Mission Support Group Commanders represent a unique synthesis of the skills and requirements dictated by the policy and strategy and the feedback from the stabilization and reconstruction literature.

¹⁰² On-Scene Commanders Course Website. See also Niel Krosner.




Figure 8. An Air Force Model of Post-Conflict Resources

The revised model clearly shows the interaction of doctrine and policy with two critical Air Force resources that could improve U.S. results in post-conflict operations. The final task is to advocate a more complete debate and review in the Air Force regarding

potential assets for stabilization operations. This research has provided two strong possibilities that, with modifications, could create a spectrum of assistance for the Air Force contribution to post-conflict operations.

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V. LEVERAGING EXISTING ASSETS FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION

This research has reviewed the key issues regarding the training and personnel issues surrounding a growing mission area for the U.S. Department of Defense. Specifically, this research analyzed common themes in the post-conflict stabilization literature and assessed U.S. Air Force training and personnel resources that may increase opportunities for success. The review found that the Air Force has the potential to positively affect stabilization operations by leveraging already-existing training courses and utilizing personnel that perform many tasks that have parallels in the stabilization literature and after-action reports from post-conflict operations. This research asserts that a *spectrum of assistance* could be created with minimal changes to the On-Scene Commanders Course. In addition, Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders were found to have significant parallels between their developed skill-sets and responsibilities and the issues raised in the stabilization literature. This work also asserted that an increased dialogue is needed to fully-develop the ideas presented in this review. Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for post-conflict operations, it is clear that there are training resources and personnel that may be underutilized and available for a wider mission. Only this increased discussion will enable the U.S. to conduct a complete review of how it organizes its training and resources for post-conflict operations. Anything less than a full analysis represents an inefficient use of resources and unnecessary risks to personnel.

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This analysis was intended to determine if the Air Force could offer additional support to the U.S. effort in stability operations. The research was designed to assess any parallels between Air Force training and personnel resources and the doctrine and taskings for post-conflict operations. This review was conducted in three stages. To begin with, a review of the post-conflict literature was conducted to determine general themes regarding improving U.S. capabilities in stabilization operations. Specifically, the literature review revealed three broad areas of concern regarding the U.S. organization of resources for post-conflict operations. The first trend addressed the integration of civilian

and military people, resources, and procedures. These discussions asserted that significant improvements in stability operations can be found in determining how to better integrate civilian and military resources. A second major theme framing the debates about improving U.S. efficiency in post-conflict environments involved increasing training and education for people involved in stability operations. This review revealed that, although there are extensive calls in the literature for increased training, there is less consensus regarding the methods to be employed. The final major area of the post-conflict literature review involved how the military is structured internally. Specifically, these debates involved assessments of currently-existing Department of Defense assets. Much of this discussion involved how current military units and resources can be realigned for stability operations.

This review's second major area of inquiry assessed Air Force training resources to determine the existence of any parallels with the concerns reached in the post-conflict literature and strategic guidance from the U.S. government. The Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course was found to answer many of the issues from the literature review and doctrinal guidance. This research reviewed four significant doctrinal promulgations that largely shape the strategic guidance for post-conflict operations: 1) The Universal Joint Task List; 2) Creation of the State Department's Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization; 3) Department of Defense Directive 3000.05; 4) National Security Presidential Directive 44. After a review of these significant guiding documents, the Air Force On-Scene Commanders Course was found to simultaneously answer many of the concerns of the post-conflict literature as well as the current strategic guidance for stability operations. Specifically, this paper found the following key areas from the On-Scene Commanders Course also addressed in the post-conflict literature and strategic guidance for post-conflict operations: 1) Provide emergency/contingency response training; 2) Emphasize peacetime techniques and WMD response; 3) Teach command and control functions during emergency and contingency situations; 4) Teach situation assessment, communications, planning, public affairs, and logistics support. Perhaps most importantly, this research asserts that the On-Scene Commanders Course could provide valuable joint training with minor modifications in delivery and content. In addition, this course is already presented in mobile format for agencies sponsoring on-site

seminars. This paper also posited a spectrum of assistance that could make this course available to a broader audience: 1) Increase capacity at Air University to accommodate additional in-residence attendees; 2) Increase use of mobile training teams to deliver course to sponsoring agencies; 3) Create a distance learning curriculum; 4) Make course materials available to other agencies to use as they see fit. This continuum would create a wide variety of options for agencies to increase their joint training and crisis management skills.

Since the post-conflict literature revealed the prevalence of security and infrastructure concerns, the final major area of inquiry reviewed the Air Force's organizational structure to determine how these issues are addressed within the Air Force. This research found that Mission Support Group Commanders were in a unique leadership position to address many of the security and infrastructure concerns found in the post-conflict literature. The leadership in security and infrastructure issues was found primarily to be a function of how the Air Force has developed its Combat Wing Structure. In addition, these senior officers attend the On-Scene Commanders Course as a prerequisite for assumption of command. Therefore, Mission Support Group Commanders were found to occupy a unique nexus of training and experience that could be applicable to post-conflict environments. With these senior leaders identified, five major areas of analysis were utilized to further assess a potential new mission area for these officers. First, the research revealed a significant pool of expertise: 76 current commanders and an additional 165 that have completed their command tours. Second, this group of commanders was found to have significant experience in Mission Support Group-related duties, with an average of 13.7 years. In addition, these commanders were found to have significant prior command and leadership experience with more than 50 percent receiving *below the zone* promotions. The third area of analysis revealed a significant amount of joint agency experience, a possible indicator of the ability to coordinate the work of disparate agencies. This integrative skill finds parallels in the post-conflict literature and is a skill-set that would serve well during stabilization operations. The fourth area of the research considered the availability of these officers after their command tour. The study found that the average Mission Support Group Commander has an average of 5.84 years left in their career to potentially serve in

stabilization operations. The final area of assessment revealed these officers to be highly educated, with 100 percent of the officers having advanced academic degrees with 75 percent having two or more advanced degrees.

B. UNTAPPED AIR FORCE RESOURCES FOR STABILIZATION AND RECONSTRUCTION OPERATIONS

This research has revealed Air Force training and personnel resources that can be brought to bear on a significant portion of U.S. national security strategy dealing with post-conflict environments. Although the Air Force is not the lead agent for stability operations, there are currently resources in the Air Force inventory that can make positive contributions to the U.S. effort. Specifically, the On-Scene Commander's Course is a training resource that answers many of the concerns regarding the need for greater civilian-military integration and training and education of personnel involved in stability operations. In addition, Air Force Mission Support Group Commanders appear to be resource that could be valuable in post-conflict environments. They are the primary senior officers responsible for security and infrastructures at their installations and they are perhaps the most capable at integrating the various response agencies typically involved in post-conflict contingency operations. This group of officers are also required to attend the On-Scene Commander's Course as part of their duties as Mission Support Group Commanders. Both examples appear to address the major concerns of the post-conflict literature. This research hopes to begin a substantive debate in the Air Force regarding post-conflict operations. Leveraging these Air Force assets means an increased chance for success in a significant area of U.S. national security policy. In addition, resources and personnel can only be used most efficiently with a complete review of all resources. Perhaps most importantly, a thorough resource review can lead to a reduction of U.S. personnel placed in harm's way. In the end, a larger debate is needed to begin to answer the *wicked problem* of post-conflict operations.¹⁰³

¹⁰³ Roberts, 353-375. See also *note 2*.

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